Do public research organisations own most patents invented by their staff? by Azagra Caro, Joaquín
  1
Conference on “The economic analysis of knowledge production in academia” 
Supported by the ANR Programme ‘Apprentissages, Connaissances et Société’ AnCoRA 
Organised by BETA - July 2nd, 2010, Strasbourg  
Do public research organisations own most patents invented by 
their staff? 
Joaquín M. Azagra-Caro* 
Technology ownership and knowledge transfer aim at the dissemination of public research 
results usually in one direction – from the university or public research organisation (PRO) that 
produced the results. However, the complementarities between these types of instruments are 
not clear compared to the bidirectional channels of knowledge exchange. We analyse one PRO 
in Spain, a country that is peculiar in terms of infrequent changes to the legislations on science 
and patents and a predominance of PRO-owned over PRO-invented patents, similar to the 
situation in the USA but different from that in most EU member states. Against this 
background, knowledge transfer (measured through PRO-invented patents) increases faster than 
technology ownership (measured through PRO-owned patents). This situation may be 
damaging to knowledge exchange (measured through PRO co-owned patents). 
Universities and public research organisations (PROs) – meaning all other public research 
organisations that are not universities – use various channels to play a more active role in 
disseminating research results to firms: they protect these results through patents which they 
can sell or license; they work for industry under contract to transfer what they know; they 
conduct joint research with companies. In this paper, we refer to these channels as technology 
ownership, knowledge transfer and knowledge exchange. 
Technology ownership is rewarding for universities because it provides revenue from 
licensing. Filing patents is becoming more commonplace for universities even those that do 
not have the reputation of being very entrepreneurial (Mathieu et al, 2008). Policymakers are 
paying attention to university and PRO technology ownership, because monitoring it through 
number of university and PRO-owned patents enables an intuitive benchmarking of the 
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technological research output of these institutions, whose output levels in Europe are 
apparently lower than in the US. 
The second dissemination channel, knowledge transfer, can also be related to technological 
output in the form of patented inventions, because it involves external funding. Having access 
to the property rights of results is an incentive for other organisations, notably firms, to 
provide external funding to universities (Azagra-Caro et al, 2006a). Patent applications may 
include the names of these firms, but it is the university and PRO staff who will be listed as 
inventors. Hence, the contribution of universities and PROs to technology increases if we 
include the numbers of these so-called university and PRO-invented patents in university and 
PRO-owned patents. There is some evidence on Europe to suggest that doing so would reduce 
the perception that the EU is underperforming compared to US universities in terms of 
technological production (Dosi et al, 2006). A major policy recommendation would be to 
reduce the emulation of US patent legislation in Europe (Braunerhjelm, 2007; Göpteke-
Hultén, 2008) and emphasise excellence in universities and technological strength in firms 
(Dosi et al, 2006). Continued support for patent ownership raises fears of greater disparities 
among universities because of a concentration of licensing income in a few privileged first 
movers, and increases the need for official statistics on university-invented patents (Geuna 
and Nesta, 2006). 
This should provide some motivation for scholars to analyse both university/PRO-owned 
and university/PRO-invented patents. The production of systematic national evidence shows 
that in some European countries the number of university-invented patents is higher than the 
number of university-owned patents (Lissoni et al, 2008; 2009). So we would ask why do 
European universities not retain the intellectual property rights (IPR) on the inventions of 
their scientists? (Lissoni et al, 2008: 101). 
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Although there is no aggregate evidence for all European countries, in those countries with 
a tradition of knowledge transfer there have been regulatory changes aimed at increasing 
technology ownership. On the contrary, some EU member states, such as Spain, have a 
tradition of university and PRO technology ownership, and not of knowledge transfer. 
Actually, Spain proportionally has fewer university-invented patents than other European 
countries (Crespi et al, 2006). 
Our first research question therefore is: Is it true that university and PRO-invented patents 
predominate over university and PRO-owned patents in all EU countries? And the second and 
related research question is: What has been the evolution of both outputs under a stable legal 
framework that promotes technology ownership? 
Some theoretical considerations and further research questions 
We compare the three dissemination channels referred to in the introduction, based on their 
direction of transfer of results (unidirectional or bidirectional) and the degree of dissemination 
involved (actual or potential). 
Technology ownership and knowledge transfer are both unidirectional in nature, but differ 
in that the actual transfer of knowledge from technology ownership depends on licensing. 
Knowledge exchange and knowledge transfer involve immediate dissemination, although the 
former is often in two directions (from the university or PRO to the firm and vice versa). 
IPR ownership distribution is not the result of one or another model of knowledge 
dissemination, but sometimes the opposite. Consideration of university/PRO-owned and 
university/PRO-invented patents as additive measures of the contribution to technology 
overlooks the fact that they are related to different channels of research dissemination: 
technology ownership and knowledge transfer. It is important not to lose sight of this 
difference since EU R&D policy tends to stress the overall importance of knowledge sharing 
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and not only ownership of patents (EC, 2007). This would not matter if there were incentives 
for researchers to conduct project-based research leading to an institutionally owned patent 
while also engaging in contracts with firms and eventual industry patents. 
Our third research question is: does technology ownership complement or substitute for 
knowledge transfer? 
The research questions posed so far refer to the first and second dissemination channels. 
The third channel, knowledge exchange, is at least as important, because the probability of 
bidirectional flows of knowledge is higher. It can lead to patented inventions, normally co-
owned by the university/PRO and the partnering institution. Bach and Llerena (2007) show 
that regulatory changes to foster university patent ownership may paradoxically lead to less 
knowledge transfer to industry.  
Our fourth research question is: what is the relationship of knowledge exchange with the 
other dissemination channels? 
To answer these questions we identify PRO co-owned patents and invented patents. Their 
combination provides a measure of R&D cooperation and demonstrates the importance of 
cognitive proximity and personal relations (Balconi and Laboranti, 2006) and of top 
patenting, top publishing public researchers on firms’ R&D productivity (Baba et al, 2009). 
In 2009, the topic of most interest in the EU policy context is to what extent is cross-border 
university and PRO-industry cooperation contributing to the realisation of the European 
Research Area (ERA) (EC, 2007). Or, is EU university and PRO cooperation oriented 
towards other EU institutions or towards other parts of the world? This is the fifth research 
question. 
Note that the discussion so far has focused especially on universities. This is because 
universities have received more attention than other public producers of knowledge. The issue 
of technology ownership by PROs is also important, because these PROs are under the same 
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sorts of funding pressures as universities (Laudel, 2006; Sanz-Menendez and Cruz-Castro, 
2003). Furthermore, the promotion of technology ownership at PROs is subject to similar 
regulatory changes such as deciding between the researcher or the institution’s privilege (Potì 
and Reale, 2005) and may encounter similar obstacles due to lack of individual rewards for 
scientists (Moutinho et al, 2007). 
It is possible to claim that no parallel can be drawn between ownership patterns related to 
PRO-invented patents, and university-invented ones. This is because the contractual 
relationship between academic scientists and their universities may differ from the one 
between PROs and their scientists. Traditionally, academic scientists perform research by 
drawing on external funds, so ownership of a patent does not go to the university, but to the 
organisation that pays for the inventive effort, so it does not come as a surprise that many 
academic patents are owned by business companies. On the contrary, PRO scientists mostly 
perform research funded by the same PRO for which they work, which will naturally reclaim 
property over the results. However, not only internally-funded but also government-funded 
university research tends to produce university-owned patents (this was the main change 
introduced by the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 in the US, see Ganz-Brown, 1999; Jaffe, 2000). 
And if we add university and government funding, the proportion over total funding is about 
the same for universities and PROs in the EU27 (Table 1: columns 2-3). There are also 
similarities between universities and PROs in the relative freedom enjoyed by both, to engage 
in a number of contractual relationships that do not involve their employer, which will not (as 
a consequence) have a say on IPR matters (an extreme form of this freedom is the German 
and Scandinavian professor’s privilege). Actually, the proportion of business funding of PRO 
R&D has grown faster than that of university R&D in the EU27, which suggests that PRO-
invented patents could have grown faster than university-invented patents (Table 1: columns 
4-5). 
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Table 1. Government and higher education expenditure on R&D by source of funding in the 
EU27 and Spain 
Year 
Share of 
government 
+ higher 
education 
funding of 
government 
R&D 
expenditure 
in the EU27 
Share of 
government 
+ higher 
education 
funding of 
higher 
education 
R&D 
expenditure 
in the EU27 
Share of 
business 
funding of 
government 
R&D 
expenditure 
in the EU27 
Share of 
business 
funding of 
higher 
education 
R&D 
expenditure 
in the EU27 
Share of 
government 
+ higher 
education 
funding of 
government 
R&D 
expenditure 
in Spain 
Share of 
government 
+ higher 
education 
funding of 
higher 
education 
R&D 
expenditure 
in Spain 
Share of 
business 
funding of 
government 
R&D 
expenditure 
in Spain 
Share of 
business 
funding of 
higher 
education 
R&D 
expenditure 
in Spain 
1992 : : : : 93% 89% 4% 7% 
1993 90% 89% 6% 6% 91% 90% 4% 6% 
1994 90% 88% 6% 6% 91% 90% 4% 6% 
1995 90% 88% 6% 6% 87% 84% 5% 8% 
1996 90% 87% 5% 6% 88% 86% 5% 7% 
1997 88% 86% 6% 6% 86% 86% 5% 6% 
1998 87% 85% 7% 7% 84% 83% 6% 7% 
1999 86% 85% 8% 6% 84% 85% 7% 8% 
2000 88% 85% 6% 6% 84% 88% 6% 7% 
2001 86% 85% 7% 7% 83% 84% 7% 9% 
2002 87% 85% 6% 6% 87% 83% 4% 8% 
2003 87% 85% 5% 6% 84% 87% 8% 6% 
2004 86% 85% 6% 6% 84% 84% 7% 7% 
2005 84% 85% 8% 6% 86% 87% 7% 7% 
2006 83% 84% 9% 6% 87% 86% 6% 8% 
2007 82% 84% 9% 6% 87% 86% 6% 9% 
2008 83% 85% 9% 6% : : : : 
Growth rate -9% -5% 53% 8% -7% -4% 50% 23% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Eurostat’s Statistics on research and development1 
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These trends are also present in Spain, the research context for our empirical investigation 
(Table 1: columns 6-9). In the following sections, we discuss this context deeper, and the top 
patenting Spanish PRO, the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC). We describe the data 
and methodology, present the results and offer some conclusions. 
Research context2 
In the 1980s, a set of major regulatory and institutional changes in Spain established a 
stable framework for scientific and patenting activities. 
The first of these was the 1983 University Reform Law, which allowed university 
researchers to receive income from contracts with firms, including contracts that led to patents 
and licensing. This was somewhat of a novelty; for instance, in France, these revenues always 
revert to the researcher’s laboratory. For a researcher to gain personal income it is necessary 
to create a spin-off firm. In Spain, researchers could enhance their salaries with income from 
contract work, and this enhancement has increased over time (Vence Deza, 1995: 426). 
The 1986 Law for the Promotion and General Coordination of Scientific and Technological 
Research or the Science Law, extended this privilege to PROs. More importantly, it 
introduced four annual R&D plans to consolidate and better manage a sustained increase in 
funding for scientific activities, with the first beginning in 1988. It aligned the science system 
with the generally increased autonomy in the Spanish regions and Spain’s entry to the EEC. It 
put emphasis on the need for universities and PROs to be in line with societal needs and 
particularly economic development. It marked a change from the lack of explicit regulation 
regarding IPRs at universities and PROs to clear entitlement for the retention of ownership of 
any research results. Institutions have autonomy to set the share of the royalty payments with 
inventors: in practice, usually split 60:40 in favour of the research institution. 
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In 1986 the Patent Law was passed. It updated the situation regarding IPRs (the former law 
came into force in 1929) and provided for clearer application rules, scope of patentability, 
renewal fees, infringements, litigation, adaptation to European standards, etc. The Patent Law 
applies to every type of institution involved in patenting, including universities and PROs. 
However, universities are also exempt from Spanish Patent Office fees (Represa-Sanchez et 
al, 2005), on the basis that patents are a necessary good required for universities to fulfil their 
goals. In the immediate years following introduction of the patent law, the process of 
internationalisation of patents gained from subscription to the European Patent Agreement 
(1987) and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1989), gave Spain protection under European 
Patent Office (EPO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) applications, 
respectively –although these applications are subject to fee payment. Since this time, 
patenting has gained recognition in terms of promoting scientific researchers (Guasch, 2007). 
Thus, Spain is a privileged environment for the establishment of technology ownership and 
knowledge transfer (perhaps more than knowledge exchange). The percentage of business 
funding of university and PRO R&D, currently around 7% of total university and PRO R&D 
expenditure, and among the highest in the EU, is an illustration. Similarly universities and 
PROs show good levels of patent ownership – 8% and 2% of total Spanish patent applications 
respectively (OECD, 2007: 30-31).3 
Since many studies on Europe and other parts of the world (e.g. Tang, 2008), draw parallels 
with the US Bayh-Dole Act we try to also make some comparison. However, the 
compartmentalisation established by the three Spanish Laws makes this problematic. What we 
can say is that by the 1980s the regulatory framework in Spain was very similar to that in the 
US, although it was not directly inspired by the US model. 
The 1980s also established the primacy of CSIC as a PRO in Spain. It was founded in 1939, 
and structured across several so-called ‘boards’, which made control straightforward during 
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the Spanish dictatorship (1939-1975). In 1977, there was a major restructuring of CSIC: the 
boards were replaced by democratic mechanisms, and regulation of the links with the 
Ministry of Education and Science modernised the institution. A regulation introduced in 
1984 governed the procedure for the creation and working of CSIC institutes and centres. 
CSIC currently works in eight scientific areas: Humanities & Social Sciences, Biology & 
Biomedicine, Natural Resources, Agriculture, Physics, Materials, Food, and Chemistry. There 
are more than 100 institutes and centres across the Spanish territory, and it is the main 
research actor in Spain. Its functions are similar to those of the German Max Planck Society, 
the French National Scientific Research Centre (CNRS) and, to a lesser extent, the Italian 
National Research Centre (CNR), however national idiosyncrasies introduce much 
heterogeneity, e.g. CNRS is deeply imbricated with universities and CNR is also a research 
funder.4 CSIC has fewer resources the above-mentioned PROs, measured in budget per 
researcher (Table 2). However, in terms of patent ownership, like CNRS and CNR, it is ahead 
of the national universities and PROs in Spain (Cesaroni and Piccaluga, 2005). It is actually 
the first Spanish organisation in WIPO and Spanish patent applications and holds 45% of all 
patents applied for by Spanish universities and PROs (de Miguel et al, 2007). 
Table 2. Comparison between CSIC and some homologous European PROs 
 Max Planck CNRS CNR CSIC 
Research staff  12 607 (2007) 11 600 (2007) 4 200 (2008) 10 953 (2006) 
Total annual budget in billion Euro 1.43 (2007) 3.37 (2009) 1.00 (2007) 0.68 (2007) 
Estimated total annual budget in thousand 
Euro per researcher 
113.4 290.5 238.1 62.1 
Source: Author’s elaboration of ERAWATCH Research Inventory5 
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Although in the 1980s, there was not a strong tradition of university and PRO partnerships 
with industry, technology ownership was highly valued as a way to disseminate research 
results. The promotion of technology transfer offices (TTOs) in Spain from 1989 was 
pioneering in the European context (Proton, 2007), and put emphasis on training personnel in 
technology ownership issues (Represa-Sanchez et al, 2005). The TTO established by CSIC in 
1985, became the pattern for their subsequent spread (García and Sanz Menéndez, 2002). The 
TTO plays a very prominent role in the strategy of CSIC, as reflected in the institutional 
memories, and delegations of the TTO have been created in different regions. 
The framework for science, patents, technology transfer and CSIC has remained virtually 
unchanged since the late 1980s. It therefore makes it a suitable object to study medium to 
long-term stability in the EU, in relation to the dissemination of research results. 
This stable framework is not matched by stability in the actors involved. Since 1986, there 
have been two changes in the political parties in power in government, several governments 
during the legislatures, and changes in the ministries in charge of science and technology 
(S&T) policy. Traditionally, governance was mainly shared by the Ministry of Industry 
(MITYC) and the Ministry of Education and Science (MEC), which represent different 
interest groups, and sometimes provokes controversies. In 2000-2004, a Ministry for S&T 
was established. It assumed many although not all of the responsibilities of MITYC and MEC 
e.g. the universities still came under MEC. A change of government in 2004 resulted in the 
abolition of the Ministry for S&T and a return to the previous regime. However, following the 
elections in 2008, a Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN) was created and given 
responsibility for much public R&D and innovation related activity (Azagra-Caro, 2009). 
Since 1986, CSIC has had nine different presidents, with a new one elected every 2.5 years 
on average, despite this appointment being valid for up to 4 years. Only a few completed their 
full mandate, none of them was renewed, and in two cases, they remained in power for only 
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one year. Presidents resigned following changes in political power but also within the same 
legislatures. These resignations were often associated with changes in the leadership of the 
CSIC TTO. 
Hence, despite the overall favourable funding environment for R&D, cooperation with 
industry, and technology ownership, the frequent changes in leadership meant that CSIC has 
had little continuation in the patterns of research dissemination, as we will see next. 
Data and methodology 
Retrieving patent data based on inventors’ names is time consuming. Even restricting our 
search to CSIC, we were obliged to select among the eight scientific areas: Chemical Science 
and Technologies (Chemistry) was chosen. Among universities, Chemistry is generally the 
area with the highest share of academic inventors (Lissoni et al, 2008) and it is definitely the 
area with most patents for CSIC (García and Sanz-Menéndez, 2003; Azagra-Caro et al, 2007), 
where Chemistry owns some 40% of all CSIC-owned patents6. From a corporate point of 
view, Chemistry is the science-based sector where firms are more likely to cooperate with 
universities and PROs, which means if there is predominance of university/PRO-invented 
over university/PRO-owned patents, it will show up here. Since 1992, chemical products have 
been patentable in Spain; before that time only chemical processes were protected (Martínez, 
2009). 
The area of Chemistry in CSIC covered 14 institutes or centres in 2008, 10 of which are 
included in our sample (see details in Table 3)7. 
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Table 3. CSIC institutes and centres in the area of Chemistry in 2008 
Spanish name English translation (in italics 
if not official) 
Acronym Included in 
the sample 
Joint with 
Centro de Investigación y 
Desarrollo Pascual Vila 
Pascual Vila Research and 
Development Centre 
CID No*  
Centro de Investigaciones 
Científicas Isla de la Cartuja 
Cartuja Island Scientific 
Research Centre 
CICIC No*  
Centro de Química Orgánica 
Lora Tamayo 
Lora Tamayo Organic 
Chemistry Centre 
CENQUIOR No*  
Instituto de Carboquímica Institute of Carbochemistry  ICB Yes  
Instituto de Catálisis y 
Petroleoquímica 
Institute of Catalysis and 
Petrochemistry 
ICP Yes  
Instituto de Ciencia de 
Materiales de Aragón 
Materials Science Institute of 
Aragón 
ICMA No**  
Instituto de Investigaciones 
Químicas y Ambientales 
Josep Pascual Vila 
Institute of Chemical and 
Environmental Research Josep 
Pascual Vila  
IIQAB Yes  
Instituto de Investigaciones 
Químicas 
Institute of Chemical Research IIQ Yes University of 
Seville 
Instituto de Productos 
Naturales y Agrobiología 
Institute of Natural Products 
and Agrobiology 
IPNA Yes  
Instituto de Química Física 
Rocasolano 
Rocasolano Institute of 
Physical Chemistry 
IQFR Yes  
Instituto de Química Medica Institute of Medical Chemistry IQM Yes  
Instituto de Química 
Orgánica General 
Institute of General Organic 
Chemistry 
IQOG Yes  
Instituto de Tecnología 
Química 
Institute of Chemical 
Technology 
ITQ Yes Polytechnic 
University of 
Valencia 
Instituto Nacional del Carbón National Institute of Carbon INCAR Yes  
* Service centres that do not conduct R&D; they provide management and facilities for some of the other 
institutes. ** The main scientific area of ICMA is Materials Science rather than Chemistry. 
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For each one of the institutes in our sample, we obtained a list of personnel using 
information from the web pages, augmented with direct requests where necessary. The staff 
were in a variety of different professional categories. In this study, we selected the most 
senior CSIC functionaries (the group referred to as A1 in the Spanish public system, Table 4). 
It is unlikely that other staff would be sole inventors of patents; thus, this method allows us to 
capture most CSIC patents in Chemistry. Other staff includes lower level functionaries 
(technicians, assistants, etc.), temporary staff and visiting staff. 
Table 4. CSIC A1-Group scales in 2008 (included in the sample) 
Spanish name Literal English translation 
Profesor de investigación Research professor 
Investigador científico Scientific researcher 
Científico titular Titular scientist 
Titulado superior especializado Specialised high degree holder 
 
Based on this information, we built a database of 323 CSIC researchers in 2008. Of course, 
the disadvantage of this is that it excludes researchers who were not active in 2008, but were 
active in patenting in previous years: thus, we may be underestimating the general level of 
patenting. However, this limitation applies to the aggregate number of patents retrieved. 
Breakdowns by patent type is not a problem, since this bias will affect all the series making 
comparisons still valid. 
We introduced researcher names manually into our data using espacenet8. We chose three 
patenting routes based on the diversity of the results (Azagra-Caro et al, 2006b): 
 the Spanish Patent Office (OEPM), or the LP database in espacenet 
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 the EPO, or the Worlwide database in espacenet with patent identifiers starting ‘EP’ 
 the WIPO, or the Worlwide database in espacenet with patent identifiers beginning 
‘WO’. 
Aggregating these results has advantages (e.g. giving greater weight to potentially more 
valuable patents) and disadvantages (e.g. multiple counting of patent families). In this study 
we chose a pragmatic approach – a first analysis of the aggregate results followed by a 
robustness check based on each patent route (see next section). 
Espacenet has an inventor field which made it possible to perform the search on 
individuals. Since Spaniards generally have two last names (and our sample was mostly made 
up Spaniards), the search strategy was varied. We started with the narrowest form of the 
researcher name, e.g. the first of the last names. For unusual last names, the search produced a 
few results which we checked manually. More often, results were so numerous we had to 
restrict the search by including the first name; this strategy generated a more reasonable 
number of retrievals for checking. We completed the exercise by searching on both last names 
to allow for the possibility of misspelled first names or cases where only initials were 
available. In the (fortunately) few cases of very common first names and last names, we 
included them all to restrict the search. 
The possibility of confusing the names was small in our case because of the two last names 
–an advantage in studying Spain compared to some other countries. In (again) the few cases 
where we had doubts, we contacted the researchers themselves to verify whether they were 
the inventors. Manual checking suggests that no Type 2 error (false positive) is introduced 
with this choice, following Lissoni et al (2006). 
Nevertheless, there was still a possibility of missing information in the case of systematic 
mistakes or inconsistencies in the inventor field. To complete the search, we used a database 
of CSIC-owned patents from the CSIC TTO, which was used in the study by Azagra-Caro et 
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al (2007). This allowed us to confirm whether for a given researcher we had retrieved all 
CSIC-owned patents. If a patent appeared in the TTO database which we had not found in 
espacenet, in a second stage we introduced the title in espacenet. This usually identified the 
patent, and often a new form of the researcher’s name. We then introduced this new name in 
the inventor field to allow for the possibility of retrieving other patents not owned by CSIC 
but with the same CSIC inventor name. 
Our final sample was 1 488 appearances (participations) of CSIC inventors in 888 patents –
excluding translations of granted European patents (kind code equal to T3). The information 
in these patents allowed us to classify participations according to the following fields: 
 Type of ownership: based on the applicant name, we manually created a field with 
two categories of patents –‘CSIC-owned’ and ‘CSIC-invented’ (i.e. patents with 
CSIC inventors applied for by institution other than CSIC); and another field to 
distinguish CSIC-owned patents into ‘CSIC wholly-owned patents’ and ‘CSIC co-
owned patents’. Figure 1 depicts this.9 
 Application year: 1984 to 2008 
 Route of patenting: OEPM, EPO, WIPO 
 Institutional sector of applicant: business enterprise, government, higher education 
or other 
 Nationality of applicant. 
We provide some details on the construction of these fields where necessary in the 
following sections.10 
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Figure 1. Participation in CSIC patents by type of ownership 
Results 
This section has five sub-sections. The first four present aggregated results of Spanish, 
EPO, and WIPO patent applications. The fifth sub-section (Robustness of the results: 
breakdown by patent route) validates the results for each one of them. 
Technology ownership and knowledge transfer 
The number of participations in CSIC-owned patents is always higher than in CSIC-
invented patents –three times higher on average during the period 1984-2008 (Figure 2). The 
time series are truncated and the decline in recent years is due to publication delays of up to 
18 months after application, so what is important point is the comparison between the series –
the seeming decline may not be real. 
In percentages, on average, CSIC-owned patents are 75% and CSIC-invented patents are 
25% of total patents.11 The proportion of university-invented patents in France, Italy and 
CSIC patents
CSIC-owned 
patents
CSIC wholly‐
owned patents
CSIC co‐owned 
patents
CSIC-invented 
patents
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Sweden is 60%, 74% and 82%, respectively, whereas it is 24% in the US (Lissoni et al, 
2008). Thus Spain is more similar to the US than to many of its neighbours in this regard. 
This goes against the idea that decision makers underestimate the contribution of public 
research to patented technology without counting university and PRO-invented patents (Dosi 
et al, 2006; Lissoni et al, 2008). Hence, there is still some context-dependency, which 
deserves further exploration. If the difference is between PROs and universities, more 
evidence on PROs is required. However, Azagra-Caro (2004) studies a Spanish university, the 
Polytechnic University of Valencia –one of the top universities in patent ownership in Spain, 
and finds equally higher numbers of university-owned than of university-invented patents as 
for Chemistry in CSIC. Citing a single case of a Spanish university which owns most of its 
scientists’ patent is not enough. However, this is consistent with Crespi et al (2006), which 
show that Spain has few university-invented patents than other European countries. Thus, we 
think the difference is national. There are two possible explanations: the pioneering creation 
of TTOs in Spain and the unique possibility in Spain for researchers to receive personal 
income from licensing.12 
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Figure 2. The prevalence of participation in CSIC-owned patents compared to CSIC-invented 
patents in Chemistry, 1984-2008 
The growth in the number of participations in CSIC-owned patents is generally slower than 
in CSIC-invented patents. However, the trend is uneven over time (Figure 3) and depends on 
changes to CSIC’s dissemination strategy, which in turn has depended on changes in the 
President of CSIC and the Director of the TTO. However, the increase in the number of 
participations in CSIC-invented patents tends to be in the second half of the 1990s and 2000s. 
This contradicts the belief that the impetus in the promotion of university and PRO-owned 
patents has favoured technology ownership at the expense of knowledge transfer. Also, some 
studies show a causality link between previous industry contacts and technology ownership at 
PROs (Moutinho et al, 2007) or complementarities with publication (Potì and Reale, 2005). 
Although we would not dismiss these findings, our results suggest a second causality link 
from technology ownership to industry contracts (leading to PRO-invented patents). 
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Figure 3. The (discontinuous) higher growth of participations in CSIC-invented patents over 
CSIC-owned patents in the area of Chemistry, 1987-2008 
At the individual level, the patterns are similar. First, participating in CSIC-owned patents 
is more frequent –only 18% of inventors have more CSIC-invented than CSIC-owned patents. 
Second, the correlation coefficient between the number of participations in CSIC-owned 
patents and CSIC-invented patents is 82% for all researchers and 81% for inventors only. 
Thus, it is high in both cases. Again, this evidence is in favour of the existence of 
complementarity between both channels of research dissemination. 
Technology ownership and/or knowledge exchange 
Within CSIC-owned patents, it is possible to distinguish between wholly-owned and co-
owned patents. Here the period of observation shows an incipient trend reversal (Figure 4). 
Participations in CSIC wholly-owned patents predominated from 1987 to 2003, but the faster 
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growth of participations in CSIC co-owned patents from the end of the 1990s reversed this 
situation in 2008. Although it is too soon to refer to a trend – especially in light of the 
truncation bias in the most recent years – the rising importance of co-patenting at CSIC is 
clear. 
 
Figure 4. A change from a second to a first position for participation in CSIC co-owned patents 
in all CSIC-owned patents in the area of Chemistry, 1987-2008? 
Compared to the complementary relation between participations in all CSIC-owned patents 
and CSIC-invented patents, participation in co-owned patents introduces some variety: at the 
individual level, the correlation between participations in CSIC wholly-owned patents and 
CSIC-invented patents is positive but small (13% to 34%, see Table 5). Therefore, co-
patenting can occur irrespective of involvement in other patenting practices. 
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Table 5. The relation between participation in CSIC wholly-owned, co-owned and invented 
patents in the area of Chemistry, 1987-2008 
 
Correlation of number of 
participations in CSIC co-
owned patents with… 
All 
researchers 
Inventors – 
all patents 
Inventors –
Spanish 
patents 
Inventors –
EPO 
patents 
Inventors –
WIPO 
patents 
Number of participations in CSIC 
wholly-owned patents 
27% 22% 17% 17% 16% 
Number of participations in CSIC-
invented patents  
34% 28% 20% 14% 24% 
 
Knowledge exchange vs. knowledge transfer 
Based on this low correlation between participation in CSIC co-owned patents and CSIC-
invented patents, it is interesting to investigate whether this is the result of the different 
networks associated with the underlying types of research activity (joint vs. contracted 
research) (see Figure 5). 
In participations in CSIC co-owned patents, more than half of partners are universities, with 
firm involvement in less than a quarter of partnerships. In CSIC-invented patents, firms 
predominate – more than 80% of participations while the contribution of other types of 
institutions is small. 
We can interpret this result in two ways. On the negative side, the scarce complementarities 
between co-owned and invented patents in PROs such as CSIC are associated with low 
involvement of firms in knowledge exchange, due to low institutional capacity to attract firms 
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and/or to low absorptive capacity in firms. A different interpretation is that PROs like CSIC 
are organised so that they can focus on different ways of disseminating their research results. 
 
Figure 5. Different types of CSIC patents, different types of institutional partners in the area of 
Chemistry 
We could focus on one institutional sector, i.e. firms and investigate whether firm presence 
in CSIC co-owned patents is the same as in CSIC-invented patents. Among the 82 firms that 
are either co-applicants in CSIC co-owned patents or applicants on CSIC-invented patents, 
only 2 appear in both groups. Hence, each type of patenting is related to different research 
dissemination strategies. 
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Knowledge exchange plus knowledge transfer: cross-border PRO cooperation in R&D 
In mid 2009, the European Commission was very concerned about how organisations 
conducting research should manage IPR beyond their national borders. The emergence of a 
ERA will mean the disappearance of the barriers to international cooperation, evidenced by 
co-applications for patents by partners from different countries. 
We classified the partners of CSIC co-owned patents and the applicants of CSIC-invented 
patents according to their nationalities. Espacenet data usually attaches a code indicating the 
nationality of the applicant next to the applicant’s name. In a small number of cases where the 
code was missing, we searched for a similar name and used the corresponding code. In the 
very few cases where this was not possible, we looked for the applicant name on the Internet 
in order to determine nationality. We achieved a 100% match.13 
Spanish partners exclusively appear in around 70% of total participations in CSIC co-
owned patents plus co-invented patents; 30% have foreign partners. This would seem a quite 
a high percentage of cross-border patent ownership. 
The growth in foreign partnerships has been faster than national partnerships. However, a 
preference for EU member states over other countries is not clear cut. In the 30% of foreign 
participations, partners are split 50:50 between EU and other countries and the evolution does 
not show obvious growth in one over the other (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. The similar growth of EU and other international partners of participations in CSIC 
co-owned and invented patents in the area of Chemistry, 1984-2008 
Hence, although internationalisation of CSIC patents is an evident trend, Europeanisation is 
not. One explanation might be that total co-owned and invented patents, taken as a measure of 
collaboration, is increasing with cognitive proximity (Balconi and Laboranti, 2006), making 
geographical borders less important. For CSIC inventors who cooperate with partners abroad, 
it is irrelevant whether they are from the EU or not in terms of cognitive proximity. 
Robustness of the results: breakdown by patent route 
Notice that all tables and figures so far allow for multiple counting of patent families. As 
explained in the section “Data and methodology”, this has the advantage of giving greater 
weight to potentially more valuable patents and the disadvantage of treating one invention as 
if was more than one. To correct for this, we replicate the analysis for each patent route. 
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Actually, Spanish, EPO and WIPO patents are different in many respects. Spanish patent 
applications are rarely rejected; WIPO applications are not patents strictu senso but 
designations of protection through different national routes; EPO patenting is the most 
expensive of these three, and has the lowest granting rate. It further justifies a separate 
analysis of each route. 
Table 6 provides a summary on the extent of potential multiple counting in the sample: 
most of the patents (less than a half) are national; PCT applications follow (a bit more than a 
third) and the rest (less than one quarter) are EPO patents. The series presented in previous 
sections could be at the extreme divided by 2.4. 
Table 6. Breakdown of CSIC patenting in the area of Chemistry, by patent route 
Patent route Number of participations % number of participations 
OEPM 627 42% 
EPO 334 22% 
WIPO 527 35% 
All 1.488 100% 
 
Nevertheless, our key findings hold (Table 7). The predominance of participations in CSIC-
owned patents holds even distinguishing by patent routes: it is higher for national patents, 
about the same for WIPO patents and lower for EPO patents. The correlation with 
participation in CSIC-invented patents is higher in the case of Spanish patents (85%); it is 
lower for EPO and WIPO patents (a little over 70% in both cases). The faster growth of CSIC 
co-owned patents compared to CSIC wholly-owned patents is true for all three types. 
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Table 7. Consistency of findings on CSIC patenting in the area of Chemistry, by patent route 
# Finding for the aggregate number 
of patents 
Confirmed for 
Spanish patents? 
Confirmed for 
EPO patents? 
Confirmed for 
WIPO patents? 
#1 The prevalence of the participation 
in CSIC-owned patents over CSIC-
invented patents 
Yes, more than for 
the aggregate 
Yes, less than for 
the aggregate 
Yes, as for the 
aggregate 
#2 The (discontinuous) higher growth 
of participations in CSIC-invented 
patents over CSIC-owned patents 
Yes, more 
continuous than for 
the aggregate 
Yes, less continuous 
than for the 
aggregate 
Yes, slightly less 
continuous than for 
the aggregate 
#3 The high relation between 
participation in CSIC owned patents 
and invented patents 
Yes, more than for 
the aggregate 
Yes, less than for 
the aggregate 
Yes, less than for 
the aggregate 
#4 The scarce relation between 
participation in CSIC wholly-owned, 
co-owned and invented patents * 
Yes, less than for 
the aggregate 
Yes, less than for 
the aggregate 
Yes, less than for 
the aggregate 
#5 The similar growth of EU and other 
international partners of 
participations in CSIC co-owned and 
invented patents 
Too few 
international 
partnerships to be 
confirmed 
Yes, as for the 
aggregate 
Yes, as for the 
aggregate 
* See also Table 5. 
Recall that the correlation between participation in CSIC wholly-owned, co-owned and 
invented patents (finding #4) is lower for each separate set of patents than for the aggregate 
set. This means that if even the overall correlation between CSIC-owned and invented patents 
is not so strong. Finally, regarding research cooperation, we can consider that the 
Europeanisation (compared to cooperation with non-EU countries) does not emerge even if 
we examine EPO granted patents only. 
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Conclusions, limitations and suggested research lines 
The contributions of this paper are presented in the order of the five research questions. 
(i) It is too soon to generalise that university/PRO-invented patents predominate over 
university/PRO-owned patent to all EU countries. 
The preponderance of PRO-invented patents over similarly-owned patents is context-
dependent. In cases such as Spain where ownership of an invention always belongs to the 
institution not the inventor, PRO-owned patents will be the rule, even in the absence of 
reinforcing regulatory changes, as indicated by our analysis of the field of Chemistry in CSIC. 
One limitation of our study is that we cannot generalise our results further (although 
Chemistry is representative of patenting involving university/PRO-industry interaction). We 
should point out assuming the reverse might also be premature. 
(ii) Under a stable legal framework that promotes technology ownership, PRO-invented 
patents will grow faster than PRO-owned patents. 
(iii) Both types of patenting can be complementary at the individual level, which could be 
interpreted in terms of complementarities between technology ownership and knowledge 
transfer, i.e. mainly unidirectional channels of dissemination of research results. 
The evidence for Europe as well as ongoing research (Della Malva et al, 2008), suggests 
that regulatory changes supporting university and PRO patent ownership substitute for 
inventions by universities and PROs, replacing knowledge transfer with technology 
ownership. We find also that in the absence of such regulatory changes or specific directions, 
response to demands for better dissemination of research results can lead to a preference for 
PRO-invented patents, as in the Spanish case of CSIC. For example, researchers who 
previously generated inventions that were patented by their institutions are working under 
contract with especially industry and transferring their knowledge. Work-in-progress suggests 
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that higher royalty shares from licensing income do not motivate researchers to produce more 
university-owned patents (Barrio-Castro and García-Quevedo, 2009), so they may look for 
other ways of augmenting their salaries. In other words, the disadvantages of technology 
ownership, namely delays in publication or changes to research agendas (Pénin, 2009) are 
leading university researchers to look for other ways to contribute to research dissemination. 
(iv) One challenge is to make technology ownership and knowledge transfer complementary 
with the growing resource to knowledge exchange, a more bidirectional dissemination 
channel. 
In our case study, PRO-invented patents are mostly owned by the business sector; whereas 
PRO-co-owned patents are essentially with universities. There are both negative and positive 
aspects. The negative include the fact that PROs like CSIC are less oriented to collaboration, 
especially with firms. One of the positive aspects is that institutions can nurture research 
groups interested in knowledge exchange even in the absence of an overall favourable 
environment. Linking this type of observation to the developing idea that author-inventors 
play a key role in bridging scientific and technological communities (Breschi and Catalini, 
2008) would provide an interesting avenue for research: are the most frequent knowledge 
exchangers author-inventors? It is clear that if theoretical work to model the researcher’s 
decision to patent is at an early stage (Göktepe, 2008), it would be useful to extend research to 
include the different technological contributions of the researcher. 
(v) Another challenge is to assess whether the possible equality between shares in intra-EU 
and extra-EU PRO-industry cooperation responds to a policy target. 
Our results have one methodological implication. We can retrieve data based on searching 
for PRO-owned patents, extract the inventors’ names from these patents and then search for 
their PRO-invented patents. This would account for patterns in the contribution to technology 
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of PROs such as CSIC. Thus, we could extend our study of the field of Chemistry to other 
scientific areas with marginal effort. 
Our research suggests that the importance of personal financial reward from contractual 
arrangements is a key variable in international comparisons on the differences between PRO 
wholly-owned, co-owned and invented patents. To study the influence of regulatory changes 
in IPRs in Europe, our research highlights the utility of analysing the extent to which the US 
Bayh-Dole Act served as inspiration for the 1980s Spanish regulatory changes, an early 
European experiment in a US-like institutional setting. 
It would be also possible to adopt the typology put forward by Sapsalis et al (2007) to 
identify the institutional sources of the different set of patents analysed in this paper, and rely 
on a similar approach to explain the dissemination of results generated by PROs. Through 
econometric regressions (with values of the dependent variables representing each a possible 
type of ownership) as a function of appropriate determinants, it would be possible to identify 
which are relevant, and how much. 
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1 Web page (last accessed: 25/3/2010): 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/science_technology_innovation/data/database 
2 Although completely rewritten and with referenced additions, this section draws on Azagra-Caro et 
al (2007), Romero-de-Pablos and Azagra-Caro (2009) and Azagra-Caro and Romero-de-Pablos 
(2009). 
3 However, this is an optimistic point of view. General opinion is that even if technology transfer is 
growing and is widely accepted, further improvements are required, e.g. modifying the objectives of 
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universities, professionalising TTO personnel, increasing university-PRO-industry research 
cooperation, etc. (Rodríguez Pomeda and Casani, 2007). 
4 The focus of this paper is on PROs that are exclusively or mainly research performers. For PROs 
whose role as research funder is at least as important as a research performer, it would be intuitively 
expected a predominance of PRO-owned over PRO-invented patents, because they will most likely 
own the results of the research they fund, e.g. the NASA in US (Jaffe et al, 1998). However, the 
topic is understudied and even the proportion of patent rights waived from NASA to firms has been 
increasing (Jaffe et al, 1998). 
5 Web pages (last accessed: 18/8/2009): 
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=org.document&UUID=7D87D148-BA45-
0285-61720ABAE1E2A2BB&hwd=max%20planck 
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=org.document&UUID=7D87CD70-ACB3-
9F07-3581BF1E4C65F413&hwd=cnrs  
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=org.document&UUID=AF1263EE-A0F3-
FAA9-93E2E59018E4BCCD&hwd=cnr  
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=org.document&UUID=7D87C89E-E6D5-
956E-96956EB1E2E82B49&hwd=csic  
6 Biotechnology is probably the most or at least second, important sector for academic patenting 
(Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003). Actually, the technological distribution of 
academic patents is changing over time and biotech appears to replace chemicals in the first 
positions (Lissoni et al, 2008). 
7 http://www.csic.es/centros_directorio.do?are=8908, last access: 01/07/2009. 
8 http://lp.espacenet.com/advancedSearch?locale=es_LP  
9 ‘CSIC wholly-owned patents’ includes inventions patented by CSIC and institutions with which 
CSIC forms joint research centres because, by law, in the case of joint research centres, both mother 
institutions must appear as applicants, unless one of them explicitly declines. Hence, their co-
application does not indicate the same type of collaboration as in the case of co-patents with third 
party institutions. There are two joint research centres in our sample: the IIQ (CSIC-University of 
Seville) and the ITQ (CSIC-Polytechnic University of Valencia). 
10 Other breakdowns of the data are possible. Technology class has been of particular relevance in the 
literature. However, the focus of this paper on the scientific area of Chemistry makes this distinction 
less interesting, because the technology class of the patents in the sample is quite concentrated in 
Class C of the International Patent Classification (IPC): “Chemistry; Metallurgy” – almost 50% of 
the patents belong to this category. 
11 Bach and Llerena (2008) find similar figures for French universities, but they dismiss the result, 
based on a survey of TTO, as an underestimation of inventions waived to other institutions. 
12 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, at the beginning of the period, there were only CSIC-invented 
patents. Only after the passage of the Science Law in 1986 did CSIC start to apply for patents, with 
the first ones appearing in 1987. However, absolute numbers are too low to talk about a trend 
reversal. 
13 Sometimes, there was more than one partner. If the nationalities of the partners were the same, we 
attributed this nationality to the participation. If different, we would have had to apply a fractional 
counting method. However, in the results we present here we aggregated countries into meaningful 
blocks, and there were no cases of applicants from different blocks, so there has no need to apply a 
fractional count. 
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